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 Food ﬁghts: Food prices and civil
conﬂict in Africa
Over one million people have died from direct
exposure to civil conﬂict in Africa since the
end of the Cold War alone. What causal role
do economic factors play in this tragedy? We
study the effect of world food prices on
violence across the continent, ﬁnding that the
impact depends on both the type of conﬂict
and whether a region mainly produces or
consumes food.
The role that economic conditions have in shaping conflict risk
is notoriously difficult to identify. Civil conflict can cause
enormous economic damage by destroying human and physical
capital, so any correlations between economic conditions and
conflict could be explained by reverse causality. Moreover, the
type of institutional environment in which conflict occurs is
likely to be the type that also depresses economic activity,
raising the additional concern of omitted factors that confound
the analysis.
Identifying economic effects using high-resolution data on
prices and conﬂict
To overcome these challenges, we study the impact of food
price shocks on local conflict using panel data constructed at
the level of a 0.5 x 0.5-degree subnational grid cell (roughly
55km x 55km at the equator) across the African continent.
Studying conflict at this local level has several advantages over
the more traditional country-level approach. Since food crops
represent a higher average share of both production and
consumption in Africa than in any other region, a price spike
can be expected to significantly raise income for agricultural
producers and reduce real income for consumers at the same
time. With the help of spatial data on where specific crops are
grown and consumed, we are able to separate these producer
and consumer effects within countries. Moreover, we can
confidently dismiss the potentially confounding concern that
African civil conflict affects world cereal prices, given that the
entire continent accounts for less than 6% of global production
over our sample period. The recent emergence of highly detailed
data on African conflict also allows us to consider the effects of
price movements on different varieties of violence within
countries.
Factor conﬂict: for permanent control of land
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“
We first look at the type of large-scale armed conflict that tends
to be the subject of most attention among researchers. We label
this “factor conflict”, as these battles typically relate to the
permanent control of land. Our results identify the differences
that one would expect to see between places with crop
agriculture and those without. A rise in food prices of one
standard deviation leads to a 17% decline in conflict in regions
where food production is common and farmers benefit from
higher prices, and a 9% increase in conflict in populated areas
with no food production – areas where consumers are hurt by
rising food prices.
Real income is a fundamental factor in the decision
to fight ”
This finding is consistent with the idea that opportunity costs
are important drivers of violence: when food prices are high, it
makes more sense for producers to harvest crops; when they are
low, farmers must look for other ways to make ends meet. At
the same time, high prices can push some of the poorest
consumers toward joining armed conflict groups in order to
maintain a living wage; a fall in prices, on the other hand,
pushes their real wages up and allows them to return to the
productive sector. In both cases, real income is a fundamental
factor in the decision to fight.
Output conﬂict: the taking of movable goods
The second type of violence we consider relates not to the
control of territory but to the appropriation of output. This
“output conflict”, as we call it, is more transitory, more
atomistic, and less organised than factor conflict. The goal of
output conflict is simply to take food, money, or other movable
goods. It can appear in our dataset as looting, raiding, rioting,
or interpersonal theft.
As with factor conflict, higher food prices cause an increase in
output conflict in areas without crop agriculture (e.g., urban
centres). This finding is consistent with the idea that declining
real wages push some consumers towards appropriation in
order to make ends meet. The more interesting distinction,
however, comes in areas with crop agriculture. In contrast to
factor conflict, we see clear evidence that output conflict
increases with rising food prices in regions that produce the
associated crops. What can explain this difference? Even in
food-producing regions, not everyone makes a living from
farming. For net consumers in these regions, higher food prices
simultaneously (i) lower real income, as a given wage buys less
food, and (ii) increase the value of appropriable output, as
nearby farmers have assets that have appreciated in value.
These forces provide incentives for consumers to engage in
output conflict when prices rise.
We corroborate this finding using a large multi-country survey
dataset with information on self-reported crime. Commercial
farmers who grow food crops in food-producing regions are
more likely to report being victims of theft and physical assault
following a spike in food prices. Interestingly, farmers who
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following a spike in food prices. Interestingly, farmers who
instead grow cash crops such as cotton or coffee do not report
being victimised following an equivalent price spike. In this
case, higher prices are unlikely to have reduced real income for
consumers, who tend not to purchase cash crops in order to get
by.
Key relationships and policy implications
In sum, the effect of food prices on conflict in Africa depends
on both the sub-national location and the type of conflict.
Global price increases lower large-scale factor conflict in
agricultural areas, and increase it in urban areas. For output
conflict, the effect is more straightforward: higher prices will
increase the incidence of conflict in both rural and urban areas.
Overall, our results provide clear evidence that much of the
observed conflict in Africa has economic roots. Our approach
allows us to isolate the role of changing economic conditions
from other factors that might affect conflict risk (such as
governance), and to show that these changes can have
quantitatively large effects on different types of conflict.
Our findings suggest that policies to minimise conflict risk in
the face of food-price shocks must be tailored to sub-national
areas. Incentives to farm rather than fight can reduce the risk of
factor conflict in rural areas when global prices are critically
low. Similarly, policy makers ought to be prepared for potential
instability in urban areas when global prices are critically high.
Potential policy responses include guaranteed prices for
producers and well-timed releases of buffer-stock food for
consumers when global prices reach critical levels in either
direction. A complementary approach could take the form of
local “workfare” programmes—welfare conditional upon work
—that shift from urban to rural regions as prices fall, and vice
versa.
